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Similarly, the Other is unable to respond to me insofar as intersubjectivity
requires both persons to be able to recognize the subjectivity of the Other.
Thus, all sense of ethical responsibility and intersubjective recognition is
made impossible through facial recognition software; all that is left is conflict
and objectification, and our moral knowledge of the other is stolen away from
us by the objectification and circumscription of the Other.
NOTES
l. I recognize that this claim is itself problematic and warrants its own careful
investigation (presumably through the work of Foucault, who brought to our attention
the dangers of the technology of surveillance in Discipline and Punisft), but I leave
this claim in its controversial status because the developer of NameTag boasts about
this capability.
2. One notes that Sartre is deeply indebted to Hegel's Phenomenology of the Spirit,
especially sections 431 and 433, wherein Hegel asserts that consciousnesses battle
each other to assert themselves in the "master-slave" relationship.
Chapter 1-7
Situated Mediation and
Technological Reflexivity
Smartphones, Extended MemorA, and
Limits of Cognitizte Enhancement
Chris Drain and Richard Charles Strong
In 1928, Paul Val6ry speculated that "like water, like gas, like electric current
which are brought from far away and in to our homes, responding to our
needs through almost zero effort, so we shall be served visual or auditory
images which will appear and disappear at the smallest gesture" (Val6ry
1960). This passage, partially incorporated into Walter Benjamin's "The
Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility," illustrates
how Val6ry's imagination did not go far enough (Benjamin 2006). Today the
effortless command of "visual or auditory images" is not limited to passive
sensory experience. Indeed, with the ubiquitous computing afforded by the
smartphone, it is available for many anytime, anywhere.
In 2014, 58 percent of Americans had smartphones according to the Pew
Research Center. Projections compiled by data firm Emarketer show that
by 2016,20 percent of people in the world will own a smartphone. These
numbers present a slow and silent revolution in everyday ubiquitous com-
puting. For many, smartphones have become indispensable for work and
leisure, for maintaining human relationships, and even for trying to find one's
"soulmate." In light of smartphone technology, there has been and continues
to be a nontrivial modification of what humans are, how they act, and what
they know. No small amount of ink has been spilled prognosticating what
the future of humanity will entail with respect to digital technologies (Fuller
20ll). However, we insist that even making sense of the present is no small
task. The smartphone is not the harbinger of changes for humanity. It is the
instrument, evidence, and scaffold of changes already wrought, of practices
already modified, of memory and perception already altered.
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Central to our project is the foregrounding of the notion of technological
reflexivity. Technological reflexivity refers to the way in which technological
practices have a bidirectional causal influence and on human agents. Such
bidirectionality shouldn't be conceived of only in the manner of tradi-
tional propositional logic as an "if-and-only-if' between two sets of terms.
In accordance with but also extending beyond the thematic concerns of the
paradigrns of situated cognition and actor network theory, the "directionality"
in bidirectional causation can refer to higher and lower order levels of causal
explanation-from institutional levels acting causally on individual actors
from the "top-down," to individuals causally acting on society as a whole
"from the bottom up," as well as actors affecting each other "horizontally,"
a process which itself alters the causal feedback of the system as a whole
(Sawyer 2005).t Looked at from this latter horizontal aspect, technological
artifacts occasion the hybridization of human and nonhuman agency, which
in turn endows both the user and the device with new ranges of possible
action (Malafouris 2013). Put another way, the situated potentials for action
between material things in the world and the interactional processes thereby
afforded need to be seen as not only constituting the possibility of agency, but
thereby also comprising it. Eo ipso, agency must be de-fused from any local,
"contained" subject and be understood as a situational property in which sub-
jects and objects can both participate. Any technological artifact should thus
be understood as a complex of agential capacities that function relative to any
number of social and material factors.
Keeping in mind that we are co-constituted by webs of relations involving
increasingly complex collections of artefacts, networks, niches, and com-
munities of practice, our investigation will be guided by intenogating the
functional potential of a thing that in the last fifteen years has seamlessly
worked its way into the everyday life of millions of human agents. This
"thing," the smartphone, is merely a nodal point in a highly complex network.
Recognizing this massive "collective," we nevertheless want to show some
of the ways in which something as seemingly mundane as a smartphone can
reflexively alter the range of actions available to a cognitive agent (Latour
1994). Specifically, we hope to shed light on some of the social-cognitive
consequences of technological mediation by looking at the complementary,
if not mutually implied, domains of memory and knowledge.
I. MEMORY AND SOCIAL-ARTIFACTUAL MEDIATION
In this section, we will look at some of the impacts that smartphone use has
on memory. While the case has been made that ubiquitous computing has
already altered the cognitive functions of attention and short-term memory,
we will be limiting our discussion to the effects of smartphone use on explicit
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long-term memory (Hayles 2007; Carr 2010). The relevance of smartphones
with respect to semantic memory will be touched on here, but more directly
addressed in the next section insofar as it relates to our everyday knowledge
and beliefs. We choose episodic memory because its autobiographical, apper-
ceptive, and temporalizing aspects relate most clearly to our larger thesis that
the smartphone is a potent material agent that significantly alters the range of
cognitive actions available to its user (Campbell 1997). And with respect to
memory, such reflexive technology plays a vital role in the social construc-
tion of the self and collective remembering.
I.1 Situating Memory
From the perspective of situated cognition, memory is viewed not simply
as a retrieval system but rather as a reconstructive process that depends
on ever-changing contextual inputs. Literally extending connectionist and
constructivist schemas that explain remembering as a process entailing the
activation of superimposed neural "traces" whose distribution and potency
depends on the history of the network, a situated approach adds that extra-
cranial resources and processes can be just as integral to the (re)construction
of memory (Sutton 2009,219). The move from a connectionist-constructivist
to a situated account does not deny that interior neuro-cognitive processes
can be sufficient for acts of memory, but rather seeks to extend the model.
On an internal scale, remembering is a temporally situated and contingent
process of reconstructing distributed and sedimented neural traces. On an
external scale, remembering is a materially extended and socially distributed
process that relies on bodily and nonbodily scaffolds, artifactual assemblages,
exogrammatic symbols, signs, and icons, as well as joint-attentive processes
of social and dialogic cueing (Vygotsky 1997; Clark20l0b; Donald l99l;
Aydin 2015: Scalambrino 2012; Hirst and Echterhoff 2012).
The functional scope of the smartphone is vast, expanding well beyond its
original telephonic intention. A quick look at one's local bus stop, caf6, or
even Tahir Square will illustrate quickly that most people use their phones
for a variety of tasks: People converse through text, take and share photos,
record video, update social media, etc. A common aspect of these actions is
that they all include a recording or documenting element. We record with
smartphones and communicate those recordings. The phone can thus be
looked at with respect to memory as a prosthetic corrective to the deficien-
cies of bare intracranial memory, one that literally extends our cognitive
capacities.2 It would be a mistake, though, to view such a corrective as
issuing from its functional durability. It is possible that hard plastic, liquid
crystal, and microchips outmatch the durability of neuronal gray matter.
But as anyone who has lost their device to an accidental drop can attest, a
smartphone can be rendered dysfunctional or un-functioning in an instant.
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With the advent of cloud storage, however, such dysfunctionality is only a
temporary misfortune. Such information is never really lost so long as one
makes her monthly payments.
I. 2 Memory and Reflexive Mediation
The smartphone functions as a reflexively mediating device in the following
SENSCS:
l. It becomes incorporated within the assemblage of bodily appendages,
environmental features, and artifacts that we encounter in everyday life,
to the point where the phone can be considered as a prosthetic extension
of ourselves.3
2. It incorporates rzs within a socially mediated system of symbols, ideas,
and information broadly construed.
The ramifications of such cognitive coupling for how we remember can
be looked at from three levels: first, with respect to the individual's own
relation to her memories; second, with respect to social forces that bear on
such memory making; and third, with respect to how we collectively remem-
ber. It is important to keep in mind that while these levels are heuristically
isolatable, they function in tandem, each reciprocally affecting the other.
The smartphone directly affects how we construct our own personal
narratives and self-identities in that it allows for the constant volunteering
of information (e.9., texted thoughts, images), information which may be
accessed at another time in almost instant fashion without the risk of organic
or natural deterioration. In other words, the smartphone virtually radicalizes
the causal directionality of externalized memory. In terms of the causal direc-
tion of agent-to-memory, the smartphone makes two great strides. One, not
only does it make available a potentially unlimited (or at least a potentially
unimaginable) amount of "storage" in which externalized information may be
deposited, but because of its digital reproducibility such storage safeguards
this information from natural "forgetting" in a way unrealizable before the
advent of cloud technology. Two, the portability of, and in most cases, the
perpetual online connectivity of, the smartphone render the pragmatics of
such memetic exteriorization transparent as they do ubiquitous. This works
just as well from the top-down. With respect to the causal direction of
memory-to-agent, the smartphone enhances the recall potential of such stored
information for the same reasons. How one extends her memory and how that
memory is reconstructed is thus deeply altered with smartphone use.
The smartphone's function of person-to-person communication also can
alter memory construction. The fact that memory creation can depend on
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social and joint-attentive processes is a touchstone of the situated paradigm
(Sutton et al. 2010). Broadly, the idea is that dialogic cueing not only aides
memory recall but can actually comprise it. For example, a husband and wife
can reconstruct past events through shared conversation-neither can inde-
pendently recall a past event but through shared conversation they are able to
do so (Hirst and Echterhoff 2008). In such a case the husband and wife exist
as a joint agent with respect to memory construction. Adding a smartphone
to the mix only enhances this agential capacity. Surely adding smartphones
to a standard conversational routine enhances the recall capacity of thejoint-agent in question. But if we consider that many relationships are first
created and then maintained through smartphone use (e.g., through access to
social media), then the possibilities for memory construction are expanded
exponentially. Instead of human-human agential hybrids we have human-
smartphone-human assemblages, with each constituting element reciprocally
affecting the other in memory construction and recall. It is at this level of
analysis where interpersonal and joint-attentive approaches to memory blur
into the general social construction of memory.
There is considerable philosophical debate as to how an epistemic or cogni-
tive status can be predicated of a group or collective, and a proper treatment
of the nuances of collective memory is unfortunately beyond the scope of this
chapter (List and Pettit 20ll; Tuomela 2005; Searle 1995). But whether a plu-
ral subject of memory is thought of as the aggregate sum of individuals or as an
emergent entity in its own right, we take it as uncontroversial that smartphone
technology shows to be a vital component of how and what we collectively
remember (Theiner and O'Connor 2010). Given that any event can at any time
be recorded and shared by and for a multitude of agents, what and when we
remember has drastically changed. For example, the Ferguson protests, the
events of the Arab Spring, and the tragic events of 9/l I were documented and
shared in real time by a variety of sources, each contributing to our shared
histories, images, and narratives. Whereas traditional channels of journalism
acted as gatekeepers, framers, and fact-checkers of such information, such
editorial mediation is bypassed through the tandem use of smartphones and
of social media sites such as Youtube, Facebook, and Reddit. Indeed with the
smartphone in hand, a "go-to" protest chant has become, not infelicitously,
"the whole world is watching." This is not much of an exaggeration given that
any recording can become publicly available in a matter of seconds.a
II.'SMART"PHONES AND EVERYDAY MODES OF KNOWING
In keeping with our proposed framework, we'll consider what and how
an agent coupled with a smartphone can know and indeed also how such
192 Chris Drain and Richard Charles Strong
knowledge may in some cases be enhanced, diminished, and otherwise altered.
The scope of our analysis will be limited to a few of the more common ways
in which everyday human knowledge and smartphones are reflexively related.
II.L Enhancements in Everyday Knowledge
We routinely use smartphones for acts of identification, navigation, refer-
ence, corroboration, and computation. Given that a smartphone can access
knowledge with fine granularity in mere seconds wherever one happens to be,
such an enhancement marks a radical turning point in the range of such afore-
mentioned "acts of knowledge." The sheer speed of access and the amount
of facts, maps, figures, statistics, and probabilities doesn't simply produce a
quantitative shift in our potential for knowledge-enough quantitative altera-
tion in this case constitutes a qualitative change in who, what, and how we
know, as well as where we can skillfully go. The everyday character and
ubiquity of the smartphone tends to cover over the radicality of this techno-
logical alteration to our cognitive and agential potential.
The human-smartphone hybrid diverges greatly from merely biological
ways of knowing and encountering spaces and places. Take the example of
smartphone map applications.5 Limiting our analysis to the user-end experi-
ence, one can see that these maps obviate the need to acquire expert spatial-
cultural command of a place. We know that expert knowledge of a city
correlates to physical changes in the hippocampal gray matter (Maguire et al.
2006). With map applications, however, such biologically grounded skills are
largely transferred to the smartphone. This lightening of the cognitive load
brings with it both advantages and disadvantages.
The advantages are obvious to anyone who's used a smartphone to get
around in a new city: a complex and novel environment becomes easily
navigable with recourse to a map application. Such applications allow one
to switch between multiple layers of navigational information from differ-
ent and sometimes competing sources, improving drastically upon precel-
lular modes of skillf'ul navigation in unfamiliar places. If you take away the
phone, then overall navigational competency drops significantly. However,
such enhancement may have a deleterious effect on the experience of space
and place in that any robust sense of speciflcity is dissolved and leveled
over.6 Despite the ability to toggle between a nominally diverse offering of
information, such maps are largely the same for all users in that they tend to
circumvent the social and individual thickness of meanings afforded to an
embodied, phoneless, social agent. Smartphone users are also less likely to
converse with or ask directions from those around them. This makes possibly
serendipitous or friendly face-to-face social interactions less likely, a prime
example of what Sheny Turkle calls being "alone together" (Turkle 2012).
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II.2 Unintended Consequences for Learning and Knowing
Smartphone use brings with it unintended and inconspicuous challenges to
how and what one knows. In college classrooms, for example, many students
constantly use their smartphones for personal communication and enter-
tainment in a way that seriously disrupts their ability to learn and to retain
lessons (Smith 20ll). This is perhaps in part due to generational changes in
synaptogenesis that favor multitasking and diminish the ability to focus one's
attention in a sustained manner (Hayles 2007). Lessons often aim at inculcat-
ing dispositional intellectual skills. This is not the sort of processual knowl-
edge that can easily be accessed and assimilated via a smartphone. Nobody
can tweet their way to advanced literacy, ask Siri how to think critically, or
use a smartphone to grant complex, skill-dependent thinking, speaking, and
interacting. In turn, this may chip away at some of the intellectual skills and
savoir-faire that are necessary conditions for human flourishing in a democ-
racy (Plato 1997c; Dewey 1997; Nussbaum 1997). Though these trends may
be in step with other changes in our built environment, which encourage
distraction and discourage deep attention, this is unfortunately one way in
which the epistemologically "enhancing" capacity of smartphones under-
mines the gains that it grants (Strong 2014). However, it is important to note
that the mediating role of the smartphone in educational settings is not as one-
dimensional as it may seem. It is possible to imagine a scenario, for instance,
in which a student learns more by watching Michael Sandel's famous lectures
on justice from a smartphone than a student who was there in person but was
distracted by her own smartphone.
Being aware of and not overstepping one's epistemological limits has been
a perennial theme in philosophy since at least Socrates, and such a problem
is not lost on the smartphone user (Plato 1997a). That is, recent experimental
findings in psychology suggest "that searching the Internet for explanatory
knowledge creates an illusion whereby people mistake access to information
for their own personal understanding of the information" (Fisher et al. 2015).
Thus using smartphones to access information contributes to the overestima-
tion of "internal" knowledge and understanding of information. This case is
interesting in that even in its absence the smartphone can have an effect on its
user. Even when a phone is not at hand, the mere fact of being accustomed to
its use renders an agent overconfident in estimating her own epistemological
limits (Ward 2013).
III. CONCLUSION
The ubiquitous computing engendered by smartphone use has indeed already
wrought major changes to how we act as social, cognitive agents. In the
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first part of this chapter, we argued that in keeping with the thematic of
situated cognition, the smartphone allows for memory to be extended and
distributed in a manner hitherto unimaginable. The content and means of
identity creation becomes radicalized when considered from the perspective
of a hybrid artifactual agent. Such a shift consists in the reciprocal nature of
rnemorialization insofar as such a process is grounded on the constant access
to and creation of documents, whether imagistic or textual in nature. With
a smartphone an agent's personal memory is augmented and enhanced, and
insofar as that agent is merely one part of an assemblage of likewise enhanced
agents, interpersonal and collective modes of memory are similarly altered in
their potential for self and social identity construction. In the second part, we
addressed how, when considered epistemologically, the "enhancements" and
modifications that follow from such hybrid agents are uneven and problem-
atic. We showed that although perpetual access to information alters what and
how the average human agent knows, it does so not in a purely progressive
or enlightened way. The smartphone alters those who use it by diminishing
their attention in formal learning settings and by producing agents who tend
to overestimate their own "internal" knowledge. In sum, we hope that this
modest contribution adds to the larger picture of how humanity is not a pre-
given notion and that alterations to seemingly fixed human capacities such
as knowing and remembering are intimately bound up with and altered by
technological practices.
NOTES
l. We realize the analytical dangers involved in grouping such diverse theoretical
paradigms. But we hope to appeal to a certain commonality between the situated
paradigm in cognitive science, emergentism in the philosophy of social science, and
Latour's actor network theory (ANT). All three paradigms avoid traditional binaries
setting inner against outer and subjective against objective. Sawyer's theory of social
emergence adds to ANT and situated theories of cognition the idea that actions,
whether social or cognitive, are subject to constraints and/or causal forces at a variety
of ontological levels each with its own relative state of stability and each in a relation
of reciprocal causality and/or constraint with the rest (Sawyer 2005, 189-220). Such
a theoretical blending, we hope, enriches rather than confuses our discussion.
2. We are not advocating that this is always a good thing. From Nietzsche to
Charlie Brooker, many have pointed out the negative consequences of nor being able
to forget (Nietzsche 1980; Black Mirror 2011). Contemporary legal arguments over
the "right to be forgotten" illustrate that this is ever more a concern in the age of
digital media (Rosen 2012).
3. The term "personal electronic device" reflects not just ownership but the deeper
attitude that a phone is literally a part of one's person. Many panic at the thought of
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leaving theirs behind and "phantom vibrations" have become a bodily experience
unique to the twenty-first century (Drouin et al.2012).
4. The effects of such rapidly ubiquitous information are not always positive with
respect to narrative construction. Take the case of the Reddit imbroglio of 2013. In
their zeal to aid in the captute of the perpetrators of the Boston marathon bombing,
users of the social media site collaborated with others users' smartphone footage from
the scene to mistakenly identify several suspects. Such crowdsourced sleuthing ended
up stalling the legitimate channels of justice (Kaufman2013).
5. We ought to point out that the smartphone's relation to knowledge is not merely
one of access but also of production (Brabham2013). However, looking at the use
of smartphones to produce maps and/or informatively tag such maps through crowd-
sourcing is beyond the scope of this essay.
6. These maps are often owned by for-profit companies and display advertising
nudges designed to make the user purchase goods and services. These maps can even
track one's movement for the sake of delivering individually tailored advertisements
or other behavioral nudges. While beyond the scope of this chapter, we recogn ize that
this is a hugely problematic issue of central importance to a comprehensive account
of everyday technological practice.
